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The paper builds a simplified model describing the economy of a currency union with 
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A previous paper on those issues has been presented by the two authors at the 57th 
International Atlantic Economic Society Conference in Lisbon (March 2004). We would like 
to thank Reinhard Neck and Joseph Plasmans for their comments and suggestions at this 
conference that prompted the draft of this paper. 1 Introduction and aim of the paper
An Economic and Monetary Union between eleven (later twelve) European
countries has been created in 1999. One of its crucial feature is the asym-
metry between monetary and ￿scal policy. The former is fully centralized in
the hands of the European Central Bank, while the national governments keep
their control over the latter. Nonetheless a system of ￿scal rules to which all
participating countries are subject has been set up: the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP).
It implies three major requirements (the actual formulation of the rules is
more subtle, but we disregard those complexities as they are irrelevant for our
purposes):
Running a nominal budget de￿cit not larger than 3% of the country￿ s GDP.
Having an outstanding stock of government debt not larger than 60% of the
country￿ s GDP
Running a structural budget close to balance or in surplus1.
In case a country does not ful￿ll the 3% threshold an institutional procedure
is supposed to be triggered by the European Commission and the ECOFIN (the
EU council of Finance Ministers), culminating in the payment of ￿nes by the
country violating the rule, in case no corrective measures are taken.
The basic rationale underneath the set-up of the pact is the fact that in
a monetary union with decentralized ￿scal policy, cross-country spillovers of
government de￿cit increase since, on one hand, it has a higher direct positive
impact on the partner￿ s output because of stronger trade links and, on the other,
a higher indirect negative impact on the same variable since higher national
de￿cit means higher union-wide in￿ ation to which the bank reacts with higher
interest rates for all the countries in the Union. This clearly leads to a more
severe problem of cross-country ￿scal externality than in an environment with
national monetary policy2, thereby calling for some disciplining devices to help
countries internalizing it. A supplementary reason is, in a dynamic context,
the risk that an unsustainable de￿cit path by one country (i.e. jeopardizing
the intertemporal government solvency constraint), may lead to expectations
of higher future in￿ ation in the whole Union or to pressures on the common
Central Bank for bailing out the country (see Buti-Eij¢ nger-Franco (2002) for
a broad analysis of the justi￿cations of the Pact together with an institutional
1The European Commission clari￿ed that this actually means the structural, or cyclically
adjusted, de￿cit. This in turn means the balance net of the part due to the economic cycle,
i.e. to the working of the automatic stabilisers.
2In a normal setting of national monetary and ￿scal policy, this cross-country spillovers
are strongly softened: the impact of higher de￿cit on foreign output is indirect because of
trade restrictions, exchange rate risk, restriction on free movement of capital, which typically
vanish or are at least strongly lowered in a monetary union. As far as the in￿ation/interest
rate spillover is concerned, it is also lowered, since foreign monetary policy will just care about
foreign in￿ation and not the overall one of the Union.
2assessment and options for reform). These dynamic issues are out of the scope
of the present paper.
This paper builds a simple model which provides a description of the econ-
omy of a currency union and which incorporates the constraints of the SGP
in the objective function of the national ￿scal policy-makers. The formulation
follows the one used in Governatori-Eij¢ nger (2004a) adding a crucial feature:
the asymmetric working of the pact￿ s rules, i.e. the fact that the two constraints
imply sanctions for the country only when it exceeds the corresponding thresh-
old levels for de￿cit, while no loss is incurred when the de￿cit is lower than those
thresholds. This set-up is used to investigate the impact of this system of rules
and sanctions on the budget de￿cits of member countries. In particular the aim
is to identify how the SGP shapes the strategic interaction between individual
countries￿￿scal policy choices.
The paper is structured as follows.
The second section outlines the model with two countries making up a cur-
rency union, specifying how the SGP asymmetric rules enter the optimization
problem faced by each ￿scal policy authority.
The third section outlines the procedure for solving the model and deter-
mining the potential equilibrium choices of de￿cits by each country.
The fourth section rules out unfeasible equilibria and ￿nds the ￿scal best
response functions of the two countries, i.e. the equilibrium de￿cit choice of one
country given each of the possible moves of the other.
The ￿fth section ￿nds the Nash equilibria of de￿cit.
The sixth section performs some simulations and robustness analysis of the
￿ndings previously identi￿ed.
The seventh section concludes.
2 The model
The model considers a two countries monetary union in which monetary policy
is decided by a single institution, while ￿scal policy authority is retained by each
of the participating countries. The two countries are identical in every respect
except for their shares of the aggregate GDP of the union, which are ! for the
former and 1 ￿ ! for the latter, with 0 < ! < 1.
The model includes a demand curve which states that the output gap (mean-
ing actual minus potential GDP) of the whole currency union, yD, depends pos-
itively on the weighted average of the government de￿cits of the two countries
(g1;g2), expressed in terms of their national GDPs, and negatively on the cur-
rency union wide real interest rate, i￿pe where the latter term is the expected
in￿ ation rate.
3yD = ￿[!g1 + (1 ￿ !)g2] ￿ ￿ (i ￿ pe) (1)
The supply curve is a Phillips curve whereby surprise in￿ ation in the union
leads to an increase in the output gap, the rationale being the nominal rigidities
which are assumed to characterize the union￿ s markets:
yS = ’(p ￿ pe) (2)
This set up is in line with the literature, see for instance, Beetsma-Debrun-
Klaassen (2001), Buti-Roeger-Veld (2001), Beetsma-Uhlig (1999), Uhlig (2002),
Dixit-Lambertini (2002) and (2003), Von Hagen-Mundschenk (2003) and Beetsma-
Bovenberg (2001) which all provide modelling frameworks for the interaction of
monetary and ￿scal policies in a monetary union.
We add the usual equilibrium condition:
yD = yS = y (3)
The monetary policy of the common central bank is represented by a Taylor
rule whereby the interest rate is exclusively set in order to reach the in￿ ation
target of the bank, which for simplicity is set to p0 = 0. We implicitly assume
that the Central Bank does not react to changes in the output gap, this is a
strong assumption justi￿ed by reasons of model tractability and by the fact that
the ECB is statutorily mandated to focus on price stability and only residually,
as long as this objective is ful￿lled, it may support the general economic policy
of the EU, contributing to the achievement of the Union￿ s objectives (see art.
105.1 of the Treaty of the European Union). Those objectives are outlined in
art.2 of the Treaty and consist in a high level of employment and growth.
i = ￿p (4)
The last equation links the total and structural budget de￿cit of each country
(the latter being bi). Following Buti-Giudice (2002), Artis-Buti (2000) and
Brunila-Buti-Veld (2002), the latter is the cyclically adjusted de￿cit, i.e. the
total de￿cit net of the part due to the cyclical situation of the economy (hence,
to the working of automatic stabilizers)3:
gi = bi ￿ ￿y (5)
3In fact, we consider the Union￿ s economy to be in recession whenever the output gap is
negative (y < 0), in that case ￿￿y is positive due to the working of automatic stabilisers,
hence the total de￿cit will be higher than the structural one. The symmetric reasoning holds
when the economy is in upturn.
4Where ￿ measures the cyclical sensitivity of the budget and it is assumed to
be equal for both countries.
All parameters are assumed to be between 0 and 1 except ￿ > 1 in order to
rule out a negative real interest rate.
Our aim is to solve the model for the optimal de￿cit of the individual country.
The ￿rst step is to identify the policy instrument which the ￿scal authorities
can use, which is the structural budget de￿cit. Once the latter is set by both
countries the total de￿cits will be determined through the equilibrium output
gap of the Union. So we ￿rst express all total de￿cits in the demand equation as
functions of the structural ones and the output gap, then we replace the Taylor
rule into the demand equation.
Then, the in￿ ation rate is found through the output market equilibrium
condition:
￿[! (b1 ￿ ￿y) + (1 ￿ !)(b2 ￿ ￿y)] ￿ ￿ (￿p ￿ pe) = ’(p ￿ pe) (6)
The solution is :
p =
￿!b1 + ￿b2 ￿ ￿￿y ￿ ￿!b2 + ￿pe + ’pe
’ + ￿￿
(7)
The equilibrium output gap is found plugging in￿ ation on the supply curve:
y = ’
￿







￿!b1 + ￿b2 ￿ ￿!b2 + ￿pe ￿ pe￿￿
’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿
(9)
This shows the positive impact of both de￿cits on the equilibrium output gap,
i.e. the positive spillovers of each country￿ s de￿cit onto the other country. The
equilibrium in￿ ation is found plugging y in the expression previously identi￿ed:
p =
’pe + ’pe￿￿ + ￿!b1 + ￿(1 ￿ !)b2 + ￿pe
’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿
(10)
5which instead highlights the negative externality of either country￿ s de￿cit
through its e⁄ect on common in￿ ation. The structural de￿cits are the only
endogenous variables still to be determined. Hence, we proceed outlining the
framework for the ￿scal policy optimization problem.
The ￿scal policy of each of the two countries is set in order to minimize a loss
function. We assume that the ￿scal authorities care about stabilizing the Union
output toward its potential level4 and about ful￿lling the ￿rst two requirements
of the SGP we outlined above. Therefore they incur a loss whenever they run
a structural budget de￿cit, equal to a share ￿ of this de￿cit (0 < ￿ < 1) and a
further one whenever they run a total de￿cit larger than the threshold set by
the SGP, t. In case the threshold is overcome a proportion 0 < ￿ < 1 of the
excess de￿cit must be paid by the country as a ￿ne, this set up is similar to Bolt
(1998) and Beetsma-Uhlig (1999)5.
Choosing the optimal de￿cit, the country trades o⁄the use of ￿scal policy to
stabilize output toward its structural level with the sanctions it has to bear if the
de￿cit it runs overcomes two parallel but partly independent upper thresholds.
Intuitively the country is faced by the risk that in order to achieve the desired
output level it has to run a structural de￿cit, i.e. to violate directly the ￿rst
constraint of the pact. It has a slightly more limited control on the second
constraint since it concerns the total de￿cit, which depends on the output gap
that will eventually arise, which in turn depends also on the other country￿ s
structural de￿cit. This means that the optimal equilibrium ￿scal choice will
also depend on the other country￿ s choice.
The optimization strategy of the ￿scal authorities can therefore fall into
four possible scenarios (we consider country 1, for country two the reasoning is
clearly the same):
1. The country runs a structural budget in balance or surplus, so it ful￿lls
the ￿rst constraint, moreover it runs a total de￿cit not higher than the threshold,
thereby ful￿lling also the second constraint, which means that the output gap is
high enough to avoid an excessive working of the automatic stabilizers. The loss
function is then composed only by the term capturing deviations of the output
gap from zero and the optimization problem is as follows:
4We assume that each country cares about stabilising the currency union wide output
gap instead of the national one, as one would expect. The problem is that in this set-up the
national output gap cannot be calculated from the aggregate one.
5This is a simpli￿ed version of what is actually foreseen in the Pact, in fact the ￿ne is
actually made up of a ￿xed proportion of the country￿ s GDP plus a variable part which is a
constant fraction of the excess de￿cit and there is an upper threshold beyond which the ￿ne
cannot be raised (0.5% of GDP).
Finally, the ￿ne is actually paid in reference to past and not current amounts of de￿cit.







bi ￿ 0; gi ￿ t ￿ 0
2. The country runs a structural de￿cit thereby violating the ￿rst con-
straint and su⁄ering the corresponding loss. On the other hand the total de￿cit
is still lower than the threshold implying ful￿llment of the second rule. The
loss function is therefore composed by the term on output gap deviations and
that capturing the sanctions for ￿rst constraint￿ s violation. The optimization









b1 > 0; gi ￿ t ￿ 0
3. The country runs a structural budget in balance or surplus, ful￿lling
the ￿rst requirement, but violates the second, running a total de￿cit higher
than the threshold. This is a pretty unlikely scenario but cannot be ruled out
since a structural surplus may be consistent with a total excessive de￿cit if the
output gap is negative and large enough to produce a huge automatic stabilizers-
driven total de￿cit. The loss function is then composed by the terms referring
to output gap stabilization and the payment of ￿nes for running an excessive
de￿cit, respectively. The opimization problem becomes:
Min
n





b1 ￿ 0; gi ￿ t > 0
4. The country is a ￿ full sinner￿ : it violates both constraints since it
runs a structural de￿cit and a total de￿cit higher than the threshold. The loss
function is then made up of three terms: output gap deviations from target and
sanctions for violation of both constraints respectively.
Min
n
￿y2 + ￿ (bi)




b1 > 0; gi ￿ t > 0
73 Solving the model
We now need to solve the optimization problem of the individual country￿ s
￿scal policy-maker.
We assume that in this two countries monetary union the two ￿scal author-
ities independently and simultaneously set the size of their structural budget
de￿cits, incorporating the working of this simple economy and the interest rate
rule followed by the central bank.
We need to determine the optimal de￿cit of the ￿rst country taking the other
country￿ s de￿cit as given and considering that corner solutions can also arise.
In fact in the ￿rst and second scenarios, as far as the ￿rst constraint is
concerned, the country can choose to play exactly a zero structural de￿cit, the
maximum level allowed, or may optimize with the constraint being not binding:
i.e. running a negative structural de￿cit.
In the remaining scenarios this would not be possible since by de￿nition they
imply the violation of the constraint, so necessarily a strictly positive structural
de￿cit.
Equally, in the ￿rst and third scenarios, the country can choose a corner
solution with respect to the second constraint: it can play a structural de￿cit
that, given what the other country does and the resulting output gap from both
countries￿￿scal moves, leads to a total de￿cit exactly equal to the threshold,
so that no ￿nes are paid. In the remaining scenarios this option is not possible
since in that case an excessive de￿cit is run by de￿nition. Figure 1 synthetises





























































The optimization problem is solved using the following procedure:
1. In the rest of this section, we calculate all the possible de￿cit choices of
country one according to the lines of the above ￿gure, as functions of the other
country￿ s de￿cit. Those of country two are the same, the only change concerns
reversing the economic weights of the countries in the resulting formulas. No
immediate conclusions can be drawn on whether these equilibria are feasible.
Feasibility of the boundary solution requires that also the other constraint is
satis￿ed and not with equality sign, whereas for unconstrained optima it requires
that both constraints are satis￿ed and none of them with equality sign. This
feasibility check cannot be carried out at this stage since equilibria still depend
on the other country￿ s de￿cit which could fall in any of the four scenarios and
in any case within each scenario. As a consequence, we cannot identify already
the move that minimizes the loss function and, so, will be chosen by the ￿rst
country. For that purposes we need the following steps.
2. We ￿nd the best ￿scal responses of country one with respect to each
of the possible moves of country two. In that case we end up with just two
numbers (and not anymore functions) for both countries￿de￿cits. This means
that we can perform the feasibility checks for any equilibrium and once we are
left with the feasible ones we pick the one leading to the lowest loss. This step
will be performed in section 4
93. Since the results on best responses of the second country will be sym-
metric, for they are identical in everything but the economic weights, we get the
de￿cit reaction functions of both countries, hence we can determine the Nash
equilibria. This will be done in section 5.
3.1 First scenario: the "virtuous" country
If the country chooses the ￿rst scenario, the problem, after replacing the output
gap with its equilibrium expression and expressing the second constraint on







￿!b1 + ￿b2 ￿ ￿!b2 + ￿pe ￿ pe￿￿
’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿
￿2)
s:t b1 ￿ 0
b1 ￿
t(’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿) + ￿’[￿b2 (1 ￿ !) + ￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)]
’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿ ￿ ’￿￿!
(14)
Based on our previous discussion, we distinguish four possible cases:
case 1: structural criterion binding and total criterion not binding. In this
situation the country chooses to use all the room left by the ￿rst constraint and,
so, plays a zero structural de￿cit. This can be played only under the assumption
that the second constraint is also satis￿ed by such a move:
b1 = 0 (15)
case 2: second constraint binding and ￿rst not binding. In this case the
country chooses the structural de￿cit leading to a total de￿cit exactly equal
to the threshold, assuming that this is consistent with a structural de￿cit in
balance or surplus.
b1 =
t(’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿) + ￿’[￿b2 (1 ￿ !) + ￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)]
’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿(1 ￿ !)
(16)
case 3: no constraint binding. In this case the country does not ￿nd it opti-
mal to use all the room for ￿scal manoeuvre left by any of the two constraints,
so it just plays the unconstrained optimum of this scenario. From the ￿rst or-
der condition we then get the following solution, assuming it is consistent with
ful￿llment of both constraints (and not with equality sign):
￿
b1 =




103.2 Second scenario: structural de￿cit







￿!b1 + ￿b2 ￿ ￿!b2 + ￿pe ￿ pe￿￿









t(’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿) + ￿’[￿b2 (1 ￿ !) + ￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)]
’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿ ￿ ’￿￿!
we again divide the di⁄erent cases. The 0 structural de￿cit is not feasible
now (see Figure 1). The equilibrium leading to total de￿cit exactly equal to the
threshold is the same as before. We just need to ￿nd the optimum in which both
constraints are not binding, which is, once the ￿rst order condition is solved:
b1 =
￿￿’2￿! [￿b2 (1 ￿ !) + ￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿’2￿2!2 + ￿ (’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿)
2 (19)
3.3 Third scenario: output-driven excessive de￿cit









￿!b1 + ￿b2 ￿ ￿!b2 + ￿pe ￿ pe￿￿






t(’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿) + ￿’[￿b2 (1 ￿ !) + ￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)]






b1 ￿ 0 (20)
b1 >
t(’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿) + ￿’[￿b2 (1 ￿ !) + ￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)]
’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿ ￿ ’￿￿!
The equilibrium exactly matching the SGP threshold for total de￿cit is ruled
out. The zero de￿cit equilibrium, instead, is still possible.
11Solving for the unconstrained optimum we get6;
b1 =
￿’[￿b2 (1 ￿ !) + B]
￿
￿2￿J2 + ￿’￿! (￿J + ￿’￿!)
￿
[Y ￿2!2 + ￿2J2](￿J + ￿’￿!)
(21)
3.4 Fourth scenario:









￿!b1 + ￿b2 ￿ ￿!b2 + ￿pe ￿ pe￿￿







t(’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿) + ￿’[￿b2 (1 ￿ !) + ￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)]






b1 > 0 (22)
b1 >
t(’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿) + ￿’[￿b2 (1 ￿ !) + ￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)]
’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿ ￿ ’￿￿!
The equilibria in which either constraint is exactly binding are unfeasible.
The unconstrained optimum is, after solving the FOC:
b1 =
￿’[￿b2 (1 ￿ !) + B]
￿
￿2￿J2 + ￿’￿! (￿J + ￿’￿!)
￿
[Y ￿2!2 + (￿2 + ￿)J2](￿J + ￿’￿!)
(23)
6where:
J = ’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿
B = ￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)
Y = ￿’2
124 Best response functions of de￿cit
From previous sections we conclude that there are 6 possible de￿cit choices for
each country, meaning 36 possible equilibria; the two equilibria corresponding
to either constraint being exactly binding, can in principle be played, as we
saw, in two scenarios, but from how the problem is structured we immediately
see that both of them are feasible only in one scenario, given what the other
country plays. In fact, playing a zero structural de￿cit leads automatically
either to non excessive or excessive de￿cit, once the move of the other country
is speci￿ed, so that it is a feasible move only in the ￿rst or third scenario
respectively. Analogously, the structural de￿cit consistent with total de￿cit
equal to threshold can be either negative/zero, leading to the ￿rst scenario, or
positive, leading to the second one. That being said, we proceed with the second
step of the procedure previously outlined:
We consider each of the six possible moves of the second country and we
calculate all the ￿nal potential equilibria for the de￿cit, corresponding to all the
possible moves by the ￿rst country. This allows us to verify for each of them its
feasibility. Nonetheless no conclusion could be made on the latter in general, i.e.
for any possible value of parameters. In order to have unambiguous conclusions
we focused on reasonable value ranges: expected in￿ ation rate is considered to
be close to 0 (which is the target of the bank), the de￿cit threshold close to 3
(given the 3% limit actually applied in the Euro-Area) and all the parameters
close to 0.5 (including the size parameter which implies assuming a low degree
of asymmetry between the two countries). The exception is ￿ which is assumed
to be slightly larger than 1 (’ 1:2).
Once we ruled out unfeasible solutions, we ￿nd the equilibrium minimizing
the ￿rst country￿ s loss function.
In order to simplify notations, we label from now onwards the de￿cit choices
of the two countries according to the two relevant dimensions: the scenario and
the case in which it may arise:
so in general we will write
b1 (i;j) (24)
meaning the equilibrium de￿cit choice of country 1 arising in scenario i =
1;:::;4 and in the case j = 1;2;3, we already used this notation in ￿gure 1. In
the rest of the analysis, to ease exposition and avoid too heavy notations, we
will not show all the equilibrium expressions, but just limit ourselves to the best
responses. One further remark on the procedure concerns the fact that once an
equilibrium [b1 (i;j);b2 (h;k)] is ruled out as unfeasible, the same conclusion is
drawn for the symmetric one, i.e. for [b1 (h;k);b2 (i;j)], since our assumption
13that the economic sizes of the two countries are close to equal implies that the
two equilibria are very similar as well.
a) Best response to b2 = 0 = b2 (i;1);i = 1;3, i.e. to country 2 playing zero
structural de￿cit:
The ￿rst country may choose to be in the ￿rst scenario, hence it would have
the three options we outlined previously.
1. b1 (1;1) = 0
This is feasible, since both the ￿rst and second constraints are respected. As
far as the latter is concerned we have in fact:
t(’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿) + ￿’￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)
’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿(1 ￿ !)
> 0 = b1
this means that it will not be a feasible equilibrium in the third scenario
which implies violation of the second ￿scal constraint: so we can already rule
out b1 (3;1).
2. b1 (1;2), i.e. it plays the structural de￿cit that brings the total de￿cit
size exactly to the threshold of second constraint. This leads to an unfeasible
equilibrium since b1 will be positive contradicting the ￿rst constraint of the
scenario, i.e. structural de￿cit being negative or 0. We therefore can already
infer that this equilibrium will be feasible only in the second scenario, which
implies positive structural de￿cit.
3. We replicate this reasoning for every potential equilibrium: in this
way we see that playing b1 (1;3) is unfeasible.
If the ￿rst country chooses to be in the second scenario, we already know
b1 (2;2) is feasible, while b1 (2;1) is not, then we need to check b1 (2;3) which
leads to a feasible equilibrium.
If the third scenario is chosen we need only to check b1 (3;3), which leads
to an unfeasible equilibrium since the second constraint is not respected. If
the fourth scenario is played we just need to check the choice b1 (4;3), which
leads to an unfeasible equilibrium since the ￿rst country would violate the ￿rst
constraint.
So the potential equilibria are [b1 (2;2);0], [b1 (2;3);0] and [b1 (1;1);0]
leading, after calculations, to the following ranking of losses for country one￿ s
￿scal authority:
L23 (0) < L11 (0) < L22 (0)
so the best response to b2 = 0 = b2 (i;1) is:
14b1 (2;3) =
￿￿’2￿!￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)
￿’2￿2!2 + ￿ (’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿)
2 (25)
meaning that the ￿rst country plays structural de￿cit but without running
an excessive total de￿cit.
For all the other moves of country two we perform the same analysis, reaching
the conclusions that follow.
b) Best response to the second country playing b2 (i;2);i = 1;2, i.e.
total de￿cit equal to threshold:
b1 (1;3) =
￿￿t(1 ￿ !) + pe￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿!
(26)
meaning that the ￿rst country plays a structural surplus and does not exceed
the threshold for total de￿cit. This equilibrium leads to a 0 loss for the ￿rst
country (L13 (b2 (i;2)) = 0), while all the other options lead to strictly positive
losses.
c) Best response to de￿cit not violating constraints, i.e. to second coun-
try playing b2 =
￿￿!b1 ￿ ￿pe + pe￿￿
￿(1 ￿ !)
= b2 (1;3):
b1 (2;2) = t, meaning that the ￿rst country plays a structural de￿cit leading
total de￿cit to be exactly equal to the threshold. This equilibrium leads to the
loss L22 (b2 (1;3)) = ￿t27.
d) Best response to second country playing b2 (2;3) i.e. structural de￿cit
without violating the constraint on excessive total de￿cit:
b1 (2;3) =
￿Y ￿! [￿b2 (2;3)(1 ￿ !) + B]
Y ￿2!2 + ￿J2 = ￿
!Y ￿B
￿J2 + Y ￿2!
(27)
meaning that the ￿rst country plays a structural de￿cit but runs a total
de￿cit strictly lower than the threshold.
e) Best response to second country playing b2 (3;3), i.e. total de￿cit
violating the second constraint while running a structural budget surplus.
In this case we end up with two feasible equilibria: [b1 (3;3);b2 (3;3)] and
[b1 (2;2);b2 (3;3)]. Nonetheless, some further remarks can be done for both of
them.
The equilibrium [b1 (3;3);b2 (3;3)] is feasible in principle but it is very un-
likely to arise, since if both countries use a structural surplus they get a strongly
7One remark concerns the case [b1 (1;3);b2 (1;3)]: solving the corresponding system we
see that it is undetermined so we rule out this equilibrium.
15negative output gap, which basically means hurting themselves, since they get
a recession which is so deep to revert the sign of total de￿cit (due to automatic
stabilizers) to positive and bigger in absolute value than the pact￿ s threshold.
This strategy could be optimal only with very high in￿ ation expectations and
with demand more strongly a⁄ected by interest rates than by ￿scal stimulus:
in that case negative structural de￿cit lowers in￿ ation and interest rate leading
to a positive impact on the output gap more than o⁄setting the negative one
implied by the direct demand channel. This is intuitively a very unlikely event
so we exclude this equilibrium.
Hence, we are left with b1 (2;2), but we can exclude this strategy too. In fact,
if the other country plays b2 (3;3), the output gap must be strongly negative,
since, although it plays a structural surplus, it runs an excessive total de￿cit.
Now, since the size of automatic stabilizers is by assumption equal for the two
countries, the ￿rst country, which runs a structural de￿cit, must end up a fortiori
with an even higher total de￿cit than the second one, so it is not possible that
it avoids violating the second constraint.
We conclude that there is no feasible response to the second country playing
b2 (3;3).
f) Best response to second country playing b2 (4;3), i.e. a de￿cit violating
both constraints:
In this case all possible equilibria turn out to be unfeasible. Therefore, we
conclude that there is no feasible response to country 2 making this move.
5 The Nash equilibrium





































































































Summing up, there are only three possible moves for the ￿rst country, which
can be represented by the following set:
￿1 =
￿
b1 (1;3) = f (b2 (i;2));b1 (2;3) = f (b2 (i;1) = 0;b2 (2;3));
b1 (2;2) = t = f (b2 (1;3))
￿
(28)
We call this set the ￿scal reaction function of the ￿rst country.
This result holds symmetrically, for the reasons previously outlined, for the
second country. Its ￿scal reaction function therefore is:
￿2 =
￿
b2 (1;3) = f (b1 (i;2));b2 (2;3) = f (b1 (i;1) = 0;b1 (2;3));
b2 (2;2) = t = f (b1 (1;3))
￿
(29)
17We can represent graphically the best responses or ￿scal reaction functions
of the two countries, taking, for simpli￿cation, the case of symmetric countries
(! = 1
2). We use continuous lines for the two functions just for reasons of
graphical representation, in fact from the above analysis it is clear that each of
them is just made up of four points:
                 Country 2 deficit
 [b1(1,3), b2(2,2) = t]
t
                              [0, b2(2,3)]
  [b1(2,3), b2(2,3)]
t
country 1 deficit
[-ta/2+peb(d-1)] /a/2       [b1(2,3), 0]
[-ta/2+peb(d-1)] /a/2
                        [b1(2,2) = t, b2(1,3)]
       FRF of country 2        FRF of country 1
Figure 3
Since the two countries are just playing Nash with each other we end up
with three possible Nash equilibria:
￿ = f[b2 (1;3);b1 (2;2)];[b2 (2;3);b1 (2;3)];[b2 (2;2);b1 (1;3)]g (30)
Clearly the ￿rst and the last equilibria are just the symmetric of each other.
We now close the model determining the values of economic fundamentals
in the Union in all three equilibria and interpreting the results.
If the equilibrium is
￿
b1 (2;2) = t;b2 (1;3) =
￿￿t! + pe￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿(1 ￿ !)
￿
the equilibrium output gap is:
18y [b1 (2;2);b2 (1;3)] = (31)
’
￿!b1 (2;2) + ￿b2 (1;3) ￿ ￿!b2 (1;3) + ￿pe ￿ pe￿￿
’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿
= 0
The equilibrium in￿ ation is determined by
p =
’pe + ’pe￿￿ + ￿!b1 (2;2) + ￿(1 ￿ !)b2 (1;3) + ￿pe
’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿
=) p = pe (32)
The intuition behind this equilibrium is then the following. One country
runs a structural de￿cit up to the point in which it exactly hits the threshold
for the total de￿cit, so it violates the ￿rst constraint of the Pact, and exploits
all the room for ￿scal expansion left by the second constraint, without violating
it. The other country reacts with a structural ￿scal surplus, in order to o⁄set
the impact of the other country￿ s policy on output gap, until it brings the latter
to 0, as the ￿scal objective function implies.
In a sense there is a division of labour between one country spending a lot
and the other compensating for that.
Since the output gap is zero, structural and total de￿cit coincide, so the
￿rst country chooses a de￿cit exactly equal to the SGP threshold and incurs
a loss due to violation of ￿rst constraint and proportional to the threshold:
L1 (b1 (2;2)) = ￿t2.
The other country, instead, is better o⁄, since it runs a surplus and so it
does not violate any of the constraints, besides it gets a zero output gap. As a
consequence it is in the best possible situation with a zero loss. We therefore
observe that the higher the SGP threshold (i.e. the softer the second constraint
is), the higher the loss for the ￿rst country, since it will violate the ￿rst constraint
to a larger extent.
It is important to observe that in this case the output gap goes to 0 whatever
the in￿ation expectations of agents are. In fact the second country, besides
o⁄setting the partner￿ s policy, also increases its de￿cit proportionally to in￿ ation
expectations in order to undo completely the negative e⁄ect of the latter on
actual in￿ ation, which in turn would lead to higher interest rates set by the
bank and, so, to lower output gap. Yet, in￿ ation expectations turn out to be
rational by construction, i.e. the in￿ ation rate is equal to the expected one
simply through the in￿ ation equilibrium expression, without need of assuming
rational expectations from the start.
As a consequence, this situation is consistent with any possible in￿ ation
rate: the output gap will always be 0 and the losses of the two countries end up
unchanged since they just care for the output stabilization and not at all about
in￿ ation, which is of course a very strong assumption.
19In order to close the model we therefore can reasonably say that, since all
in￿ ation rates are indi⁄erent for the countries, the central bank, which by man-
date must keep in￿ ation as close as possible to its target (0), will choose a zero




￿￿t(1 ￿ !) + p￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿!
+ (1 ￿ !)t
￿




￿￿t(1 ￿ !) + p￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿!
+ (1 ￿ !)t
￿
+ ￿p = 0
Solution is:
p = 0 (33)
therefore the equilibrium de￿cit of country two becomes:
b2 (1;3) =






Finally, we found that also the reversed equilibrium, meaning the second
country playing the de￿cit threshold and the ￿rst country compensating, ￿
b1 (1;3) =
￿￿t(1 ￿ !) + p￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
￿!
;b2 (2;2) = t
￿
, is also a Nash equilib-
rium. All the previous results hold in this case as well.
If the last equilibrium is played:
2
4b1 (2;3) = ￿
!￿￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)￿’2
￿J2 + ￿2￿’2!
;b2 (2;3) =
￿￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)￿’2 ￿










y [b1 (2;3);b2 (2;3)] =
’￿pe (1 ￿ ￿)￿J
￿
￿J2 + !￿’2 (1 ￿ !)￿2￿
[￿J2 + ￿’2￿2!]
h
￿’2￿2 (1 ￿ !)
2 + ￿J2
i < 0 (35)
Both countries violate the ￿rst constraint running a structural de￿cit, mean-
ing that the burden of ￿scal expansion to stimulate the aggregate economy is
shared. Yet they do not do that up to the point of exactly hitting the threshold
for total de￿cit, so the room left by the second constraint is not entirely ex-
ploited. They both end up in a second best solution since the output gap turns
20out to be negative and that implies, together with sanctions for ￿rst constraint￿ s
violation, positive loss for the two of them. A free-riding problem occurs: the
countries do not manage to split the ￿scal burden to get a zero output gap.
Each country is afraid that the other runs a too low de￿cit in order to enjoy an
economic upturn paying a lower price than its partner in terms of sanctions for
violation of the ￿rst constraint.
On top of that we observe that both countries￿de￿cit is just proportional
to in￿ ation expectations: the rationale is, again, that of o⁄setting the nega-
tive impact on output gap of higher interest rates, driven by higher in￿ ation
expectations.
Not surprisingly, the two de￿cit expressions just depend on the sanctions for
the violation of the ￿rst constraint (￿), while those linked to the second one (￿)
do not appear, since it is not binding.
6 Simulations and robustness analysis
In this section we perform some simulations on our model to check whether our
solutions, which, as we stressed, are actually valid for a limited range of values
for parameters, are robust to some changes in the numbers associated to them.
We ￿rst plugged in values close to the baseline scenario we referred to in
the above analysis: all values of structural parameters are equal to 0.5 except
￿ set to 1.2. This corresponds to the values used (except for ￿) in one of the
simulations performed in Beetsma-Debrun-Klassen (2001) for a similar model.
The values of the parameters attached to the two constraints of the pact are set
to 0.5 as well, meaning a pretty high degree of stringency of those requirements
(they can be interpreted as implying that 50% of the excess with respect to
the two thresholds for de￿cits is paid as a ￿ne). In this scenario we distinguish
two cases based on the value of in￿ ation expectations: they are set to 0 in the
former and to 2% in the latter. Finally we do not assume symmetry of the
two countries in terms of economic size to make our results more realistic with
respect to the situation in the Euro-Area. Therefore we set ! = 2
3, i.e. the ￿rst
country is twice as large as the second one. We then recalculated the de￿cit
Nash equilibria in both cases, corresponding to the ￿rst and second column of
the following ￿gure respectively.
In case of 2% in￿ ation expectation (second column) we ￿nd the same three
equilibria we previously found. We see that the symmetric equilibrium (i.e. both
countries playing the same de￿cit strategy) basically implies very low de￿cit
rates (0.01% and 0.005% of GDP for the two countries respectively). In the zero
in￿ ation expectation case (￿rst column) we see that we do not have anymore
equilibrium b1 (2;3);b2 (2;3): it is replaced by the one in which both countries
play 0 structural de￿cits: this is no surprise, since the symmetric equilibrium has
both de￿cits linear in in￿ ation expectation, so when the latter is 0 both de￿cits
21go to 0 as well. In the fourth row we show the output gaps corresponding to the
di⁄erent de￿cit equilibria. In the lower rows we performed an exercise of welfare
ranking of the three equilibria, based on an utilitarian welfare function: we found
the sum of the two countries￿losses associated to each of the three equilibria
and, in the last row, we identi￿ed the equilibrium which minimizes that sum.
In both cases the symmetric equilibrium is the best one, moreover, with zero
in￿ ation expectation, it leads to the ￿rst best situation of zero cumulative loss.
These results fully con￿rm our previous ￿nding.
In the third and fourth columns the values are the same as before except for
the two ￿scal rules￿parameters which are both set to 0.1. This is a more realistic
situation since, in the actual implementation of the SGP, the ￿rst constraint is
not very strictly adhered to, while the rules on excessive de￿cit can be roughly
approximated by assuming that 10% of the excess of de￿cit over threshold is
actually paid as a ￿ne (see Bolt (1999)). So the pact is now supposed to be less
strict.
The three Nash equilibria are the same as in the previous scenario, with
the same distinction between 0 and 2% in￿ ation expectations. In the latter
case the symmetric equilibrium implies higher de￿cits than in the similar case
with stricter pact, this is no surprise: when the sanction is softer both countries
violate the ￿rst constraint to a larger extent. The asymmetric equilibria are
instead identical to the case of tougher pact since their expressions, as we saw,
do not depend on the rules￿parameters on the ￿scal loss function but just on
the de￿cit threshold. The symmetric equilibria are still those leading to the
highest welfare.
In the last two columns we make a more signi￿cant change: we use the values
for structural parameters taken from the baseline simulation performed in Buti-
Van den Noord (2003), who check a model similar to ours. Surprise in￿ ation
as well as de￿cit have now a higher impact on output while ￿scal authorities
care much more about output stabilization. The parameters on the Pact rules
are kept to 0.1. Two cases are distinguished: in￿ ation expectations equal to 2%
and to 6% respectively.
The picture changes then substantially: no more symmetric equilibria arise
and in both cases b1 (2;3);b2 (1;1) becomes a Nash equilibrium, so the ￿rst coun-
try violating the ￿rst constraint and the second (smaller) playing zero de￿cit.
The usual asymmetric equilibria stay in the case of 2% in￿ ation expectation,
while in the 6% case only one is kept: b1 (2;2);b2 (1;3) but not the reversed one.
Intuitively when in￿ ation is higher there is need that the big country (which is
the ￿rst one) and not the small one stimulates the economy to o⁄set the tough
monetary policy stance due to high in￿ ation expectations. b1 (2;3);b2 (1;1) is
in both cases the equilibrium with the highest welfare, moreover it implies a
￿rst country￿ s structural de￿cit signi￿cantly higher than in the best equilibria
of the other cases: 0.51% and 1.54% of GDP with 2 and 6% in￿ ation expectation
respectively. It is interesting to notice that in this scenario either, the option of






































































































































































We can now sum up the results of the exercise we carried out.
We built a simple model with a two-countries monetary union in which the
two ￿scal policy-makers simultaneously choose their de￿cit taken that chosen by
the other one as given. They are sanctioned if they do not ful￿ll two ￿scal rules
close to those of the Stability and Growth Pact and concerning the structural
and total de￿cit respectively.
The (very few) analysis carried out in the literature neglected the fact that
those rules are asymmetric, i.e. the sanction/￿ne is raised whenever the de￿cit is
23higher than a threshold, but not when it is lower. In the current paper this issue
is analyzed allowing explicitly for this asymmetry in the ￿scal policy-makers￿
loss function.
We therefore divided the ￿scal optimization problem in four scenarios, based
on whether either, both or none of the two SGP constraints is violated by each
country. Then we calculated the three Nash equilibria for the de￿cit.
The ￿rst two are each the symmetric of the other, and they correspond to
the case in which one country runs a structural de￿cit up to the point at which it
exactly hits the threshold for the total de￿cit, so it violates the ￿rst constraint
of the Pact and exploits all the room for ￿scal expansion left by the second
constraint. On the other hand the other country responds with a structural
￿scal surplus in order to o⁄set the impact of the other country￿ s policy on the
output gap, until it brings the latter to 0. Moreover it sets its ￿scal policy so
that it undoes the negative e⁄ect of higher in￿ ation expectations on the output
gap. The zero output gap, in turn, implies rational in￿ ation expectations. In a
sense there is a division of labour between one country spending a lot and the
other compensating for that. The country playing structural de￿cit bears a loss
because of violation of the ￿rst constraint while the other gets to the ￿rst-best
situation with zero loss.
In the third equilibrium the two countries play the same ￿scal strategy:
they both violate the ￿rst constraint running a structural de￿cit, but they do
not exploit all the room for manoeuvre left by the second constraint. They
share equally the burden of ￿scal expansion to stimulate the aggregate economy.
Nonetheless they end up in a second best solution since the output gap turns
out to be negative. The ￿rst best is prevented by free-riding: each country
is afraid that the other runs a too low de￿cit in order to reap the bene￿ts of
higher output paying a lower price in terms of sanctions for violation of the ￿rst
constraint.
In the ￿rst equilibrium we see that we end up with a zero output gap and zero
in￿ ation, but we could get exactly the same results with both countries playing
0 de￿cits and so both enjoying zero losses (see appendix). The Pact does not let
this ￿rst best outcome arise: the uncoordinated setting of ￿scal policies under
the pact￿ s constraints lead either to ￿scal expansion by one country, totally
undone by the other, leading to an ine¢ cient loss born by the former, or by a
symmetric but softer ￿scal expansion which leads to an ine¢ ciently low ￿scal
stimulus which is not enough to o⁄set the negative impact on output of positive
in￿ ation expectations.
The simulations and robustness analysis performed in the last section show
that the above results are quite robust to changes in the extent to which the
two ￿scal rules are binding, but less robust with respect to changes in the values
of structural parameters of the model: the symmetric de￿cit equilibrium seems
to disappear if we deviate from the baseline scenario.
In this model the rationale of the pact comes from the cross-country de￿cit
spillover through the in￿ ationninterest rate channel (created by the monetary
union), that creates a trade-o⁄ with the spillover acting directly through the
24output gap. What is new in these results with respect to the analysis where the
asymmetric character of the pact is not taken into account is the outcome of
the strategic game between the countries: given that running a too low de￿cit
or even a surplus does not entail any punishment whatsoever, the issue is how
to divide the burden of ￿scal stimulus between the two countries and there is
no possibility to get the right aggregate stimulus (implying a zero output gap)
if the two countries share the burden equally. The optimal outcome for output
is obtained only if one of the two countries does the job for the other as well.
The message, therefore, is that the Pact helps to internalise the negative de￿cit
spillovers but is not enough to trigger a ￿rst best de￿cit equilibrium across
member states. The model, though, does not tackle other crucial issues that
motivated the set up of the pact: namely the risk that the common bank has
to run a monetary expansion in order to decrease the real value of the excessive
stock of debt accumulated by a member state, hurting the whole union, or,
more extremely, the risk that a country running an unsustainable ￿scal policy is
bailed out by the common bank in order to avoid a ￿nancial crisis for the whole
union. Analysis of sustainability issues clearly require a dynamic framework
and are therefore out of the scope of the current paper.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Symmetric Nash equilibrium with rational expecta-
tions
We now reconsider the equilibrium [b2 (2;3);b1 (2;3)] adding the assumption
that the private agents have rational expectations, i.e. they are able to perfectly
foresee (in this context where no stochastic component is present) the in￿ ation
rate, so we have p = pe which means that also the output gap (through the
26supply function) will end up being 0. Moreover, replacing pe with p in the
equilibrium in￿ ation expression we see that it can hold only if p = 0,which leads
to: y [b1 (2;3);b2 (2;3)] = b1 (2;3) = b2 (2;3) = 0
since they are all linear in p. This means that this equilibrium, unlike the
asymmetric one, leads to the ￿rst-best solution when in￿ ation rational expecta-
tions are assumed: zero output gap and zero de￿cits lead to zero losses for both
countries.
8.2 The ￿rst-best solution: zero de￿cits by both countries
In this sub-section we consider the ￿rst best situation in a general framework
where we do not make any assumption on in￿ ation expectations.
First-best means zero losses for both countries, which in turn implies zero
output gap, which in turn means that structural and total de￿cit coincide.
y [b1;b2] = ’
￿!b1 + ￿b2 ￿ ￿!b2 + ￿pe ￿ pe￿￿
’ + ￿￿ + ￿’￿




(￿￿pe ￿ ￿!b1 + ￿￿pe) (36)
Zero losses for both countries also mean no violation whatsoever of the con-
straints of the stability and growth pact, i.e. negative or zero structural de￿cit
(which implies automatically no violation of the second constraint either)
Zero output gap also implies p = pe from the supply side of the economy, so
rational expectations are again endogenously determined by the model with no
need of assuming them exogenously in the ￿rst place.
Than conditions for ￿rst best are summarized by the following system:
b2 =
￿￿!b1 + ￿p(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ ￿ ￿!
(37)
bi ￿ 0 i = 1;2
One solution is clearly b1 = b2 = 0, which leads in turn, from equilibrium
in￿ ation expression, to p = 0
Is there any possible solution with p 6= 0?
27if p > 0 ) b2 ￿ 0 , b1 > 0 so this solution is ruled out
if p < 0 ) b2 = 0 , b1 =
￿p(￿ ￿ 1)
￿!




fb1 = b2 = p = 0g;
￿












b2 < 0;p < 0;
￿p(￿ ￿ 1)
￿!
< b1 ￿ 0
￿
￿
b1 < 0;p < 0;
￿p(￿ ￿ 1)
￿(1 ￿ !)
< b2 ￿ 0
￿
So either there is no in￿ ation and zero de￿cits from both countries or there
can be de￿ ation with either country running structural surplus while the other
runs a balanced budget or with both countries running a surplus.
That comes from the fact that the two countries do not care about in￿ ation
per se, so de￿ ation can lead to zero loss since they can undo the e⁄ects on output
gap, which occurs through a negative interest rate, using a budget surplus, which
they can do inde￿nitely without running any punishment from the pact.
Nonetheless, if we replicate the reasoning on the zero in￿ ation target of the
bank we outlined commenting the asymmetric Nash equilibrium, we can rule
out all the de￿ ationary ￿rst-best cases:
In fact from the demand channel we must have:
yD = ￿
￿
!b1 + (1 ￿ !)
￿p(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿!b1
￿ ￿ ￿!
￿
￿ ￿ (i ￿ p) = 0
if the bank then sets i = 0, foreseeing zero in￿ ation, that will actually arise:
yD = ￿
￿
!b1 + (1 ￿ !)
￿p(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ ￿!b1
￿ ￿ ￿!
￿
+ ￿p = 0
) ￿￿p = 0 ) p = 0
which is consistent, as we saw, only with zero de￿cits by both countries.
We conclude that the general ￿rst-best equilibrium is: fb1 = b2 = p = 0 =) L1 = L2 = 0g
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